Bakassi, Biafra, and Boko Haram: The International Linkage and Implication

The domestic linkage between and among Bakassi, Biafra, and Boko Haram is the uncertainty over Nigeria’s future, created by the three of them and that is hardly reflected on by policy makers and the Nigerian elite. In contemporary international relations, observers are always quick to note that since the end of World War II in 1945, there has been no new World War.

They quickly admit that the world is only witnessing pockets of internal conflicts in some countries. This observation cannot be disputed. However, the new truth is that efforts have not been made to explain why the internal conflicts are on the increase and why the making of a new  World War cannot be a resultant from centripetal factors and methodology.

The WW II, like the 1914-1919 one, was fought from a centrifugal approach, starting from a location and spreading thereafter to other areas. What is happening now is that there are many theatres of war in different regions of the world that are not only threatening sub-regional and regional peace and security but that are also critically undermining global peace and security. This is to the extent that the main purpose of maintenance of international peace and security, for which purpose the United Nations was specifically created, can no longer be fulfilled.

In Asia, both China and Russia have territorial disputes with Japan. The two Koreas are friendly enemies. The West sought a regime change in Libya, and by so doing, has murdered sleep and Libyans can no longer sleep. The Syrian conflict has provided a new crisis between Turkey and Russia with the shooting down of a Russian war plane claiming to be fighting terrorists or the Islamic State soldiers. Here in Africa, the Casamance Province in the southern part of Senegal has been fighting for autonomy. Somalia has been grappling with terrorist unrest for many decades. The situation in Sudan is not different even with the carving out of South Sudan out of the former Sudan.

Even though the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the 1810 Latin American principle of uti possidetis (maintenance of colonial frontiers at the time of independence or sanctity of colonial frontiers), it is on record that the principle could not be one hundred percent  respected or applied. Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia, even though Ethiopia was never colonized. Italy tried to colonise Ethiopia in 1936 but was shamefully repelled. Sudan was split into two after more than thirty years of fratricidal war.

The decolonisation of the Spanish Sahara is not yet complete with the quagmire between the Saharaoui Arab Republic and the Morocco. It is the only decolonization question with which the African Union is yet to finally resolve. Bakassi, Biafra, and Boko Haram are different issues in Nigeria’s foreign relations. They border essentially on loss of territory or secession. They not only raise the issue of application of uti possidetis but also that of self-determination, even though the principle of self-determination applies specifically to colonized or dependent territories.

Explained in other words, as issues, Bakassi, Biafra and Boko Haram jointly raise the extent to which Nigeria can be territorially prevented from being dismantled. In other words, to what extent is Nigeria’s national unity and territorial integrity not threatened? This column holds the strong view that Bakassi, Biafra, and Boko Haram are not only current, but also potential threats to national unity in the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is the need to begin to address the linkages between and among the Bakassi, Biafra, and the Boko Haram as a major foreign policy issue, especially in terms of the international prediction that Nigeria might disintegrate in 2015.

The Bakassi
The Bakassi peninsula, as seen by many observers, now belongs permanently to Cameroon, especially following the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which gave the sovereignty over the peninsula to Cameroon to the detriment of Nigeria, and the effective handing over of the peninsula by Nigeria. The first problem here is that distinction between people occupying a disputed land, on the one hand, and the land over which there is dispute, on the other hand, was not made.

Even though the people that had and still have effective occupation of the Bakassi peninsula are Nigerians by ius sanguinis and cultural descent, a situational fact that the Government and people of Cameroon never disputed even at the level of the ICJ trial, is the emphasis on which Cameroon insisted that sovereignty over the peninsula had been transferred to her through international treaties, and particularly by the 1975 Maroua bilateral agreement and the 1972 controversial agreement on Ngor-Coker line.

Perhaps more significantly, the Nigerian occupants of the peninsula owe allegiance to Nigeria while they live on a territory over which Cameroon has sovereignty. They do not owe allegiance to Cameroon mainly because of their cultural linkages with their kith and kin in Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers States. Besides, Cameroon is not on record to have generally complied with the obligations provided for in the Green Tree Agreement by which sovereignty was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon. And most interestingly, there is also the potential problem of Anglophone Cameroon, forging an alliance in the future with the Bakassians with the ultimate objective of establishing an independent and sovereign state or an international territory that will be completely independent of both Nigeria and Cameroon in terms of political governance.

This possible situation can be explained by the fact that Anglophone Cameroon has not been happy about their marginalization within the framework of Francophone politics. Although Cameroon has clearly been showing greater accommodation of the bilingual character of her national life in her international relations, especially with her membership of the Commonwealth organization, the struggle of the Anglophone Cameroonians for autonomy can no longer be written off with a stroke of the pen.

In the same vein, the people of the Bakassi have not been happy with the Government of Nigeria with the way they have been ‘sold’ to Cameroon on a platter of gold with much enthusiasm. There have been much mistreatment of the people of the Bakassi by Cameroonian gendarmes. As a result, the Bakassians are increasingly becoming hardened by the day. In the thinking of the effective occupants of the peninsula, they have been unjustifiably ‘sold’ out.

One point of major concern is the eventuality of the people of Bakassi becoming more radicalized and deciding to engage in violence in self-defence and going to the extent of guerrilla warfare in reaction to Nigeria’s rejection and Cameroon’s mistreatment and violations of the Green Tree Agreement.

How will Nigeria and Cameroon contain such guerrilla warfare? The long time implication of giving away with much ease the Bakassi peninsula and its people constitutes a direct negation of the requirements of the Constitution of Nigeria: obligation of protection and defence of territorial integrity of Nigeria. The requirement of national unity and territorial integrity necessarily conflicts with another foreign policy obligation provided for in the same Constitution of Nigeria, which is that Nigeria shall respect international law and treaty obligations entered into by virtue of international treaties signed and ratified by Nigeria.

Consequently, the critical challenge remains the choice between respecting either of the two provisions in Nigeria’s Constitution. Another issue here is that Nigeria is not a Monist, but a Dualist country. Should Nigeria seek to respect international law first or Nigeria’s Constitution first if such a respect is to the detriment of Nigeria’s national interest?

Biafra and Self-determination
It is useful to begin with a distinction between the Biafra that never was or that was but is no more, on the one hand, and a new Biafra in the making or being struggled for, on the other. The proponents of the new Biafra have summarized their grievances under marginalization and neglect. In the strong belief that little or no attention is being paid to their complaints, they are pushing for autonomy on the basis of the principle of self-determination.

It is also useful to note that the problem of Biafra is different in law and nature from that of the Bakassi. At the level of the Bakassi, Nigeria, as noted earlier, is not a Monist State. Nigeria is a Dualist State. Nigeria does not automatically accept any international treaty entered into by its Government as Monist countries do. As a dualist country, even if the Federal Government of Nigeria has not only signed but also ratified an international agreement, a treaty must still be domesticated by the National Assembly before it can be part of the municipal law and enforceable in Nigeria.

The Green Tree Agreement by which the Bakassi peninsula was lost to Cameroon was, at best, fraudulent and illegal mainly because of its non-domestication as constitutionally required. It was not an Executive Agreement by whatever definition, even though some reputable international lawyers prefer to mitigate the political tension generated by the loss by arguing that the agreement was in implementation and application of the ruling of the International Court of Justice to which Nigeria freely consented ab initio.

    Additionally, like in the case of the Bakassi, the issue of Biafra is more political than legal. Legally speaking, the rule of law is meaningful only to the extent of the preparedness of the people for whom it is meant to respect it. Under what context can law overrule self-political determination without also factoring in reactive violence? This question raises the point of Mohammed Haruna in his column of Wednesday, December 9, 2015 on “Towards a Viable Federation” (The Nation, December 9, 2015, back page). According to Haruna, all talks about restructuring Nigeria are ‘glib talks… The problem with those who talk so much about restructuring Nigeria is clearly their refusal to come to terms with the fact that the forces of state creation have since become difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.’

Mohammed Haruna also has it that ‘instead of wasting time talking about an almost impossible political structuring, we should draw a line with our current 36 States and make the best we can of their structure.’
Haruna cannot be more correct if we are discussing the ideal situation but what is ideal is quite different from what is. A war planned for is also different from a war that is imposed on someone.

Consequently, it is better to begin to go beyond the consideration of the restructuring talks as ‘glib’. One major problem with policy makers in Nigeria is their pretence to all areas of knowledge when it comes to policy calculations. When informative advice is given to them, they take it lightly. About four years ago, the British Prime Minister told the whole world in his address to the UN General Assembly that young people were being trained in the Federal Capital Territory for terrorist purposes. He provided information on a terrorist cell very close to Abuja. This column drew further attention to the report. Last week, the Department of State Security announced the discovery of a terrorist cell near Abuja. Is this a new discovery?

What happened to the first discovery? Haruna will be right if those in power are ready to address the problems of the 36 States. It is the don’t care attitude of policy makers that is generating politics of anti-Nigerianness as at today. Many are the so-called leaders, Major Generals or Generals of the Nigerian Armed Forces that never fought any war, senior or elder citizens that have no junior ones, holders of National Honours that have criminal records, professors that cannot profess, etc. These are some of the dynamics explaining the growing anti-Nigeria sentiments.

Besides, in the communiqué of the North, South-South, South East Dialogue, chaired by Alhaji Maitama Sule and held at the Sheraton Hotels and Towers, Abuja, on 9th December, 2015 four main causes of crises in Nigeria were identified: national question which precipitates anger, acrimony and animosity; reign of impunity prompting policies of exclusion; non-respect for all the component parts of Nigeria; and non-respect for the rights of citizens of Nigeria. In this regard, the first recommended solution is ‘that the unity of Nigeria shall continue to remain sacrosanct, despite the inherent imperfections in our nation state, and as such, the Dialogue resolves to continually pursue the path of peace and stability…’ (Daily Sun, December 10, 2015, p. 43) Is the existence of imperfections in the polity not generated because of the emphasis on the sanctity or non-negotiability of national unity? Is it not because it is always argued that national unity is a desideratum that room is given to political recklessness and chicanery?

Biafra should remind us about how wars start and become world wars. It starts with a small issue and later snowballs into bigger issues.
The way Government is going about the Biafran question through acts of intimidation can only serve as catalysts in the quest for biafranisation. There is therefore the need for great caution.

Government should always respect any court ruling on Biafran matters, as not doing so can only give more room to radicalisation. Government cannot enforce a law which it refuses to comply with. Government should seek a constructive dialogue with the leaders of Biafra convince them of the beauty of a stronger, more united Nigeria, and particularly the strength in unity. All those who argue that there cannot be another Biafra only limit their arguments to the level of hypothesis.

The Boko Haram Saga
Boko Haram is more serious a problem and threat to national stability because of its international linkages to Al Qaeda. The seriousness is also explainable by its main objective which is to establish a Sharia-compliant Islamic State in Nigeria. The objective is either to carve out an Islamic State out of the present Nigeria or to completely turn the whole country into an Islamic State. In the first case, there cannot but be a cession of part of the national territory. In the second case, the name Nigeria may not exist anymore.

When the foregoing three cases are further investigated, Bakassi may not precipitate further cession of land to Cameroon in the future but a new generation of Bakassians may seek re-union with their kith and kin in the future. A new State from such a reunion may also not be ruled out. The existence of Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the announcement on Sunday, 6th December 2015 of name change from MASSOB to Biafra Independent Movement (BIM), as well as the establishment of an Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) all point to the quest for self-determination and autonomy. The number of the proponents of this autonomy may be limited as of now however, there is nothing to suggest that it will not increase in the future.

Bakassi, Biafra and Boko Haram therefore constitute three different theatres of threats to the survival of Nigeria as a united, sovereign
nation-state. This has the potential of sending a wrong signal to the international community. Foreign policy should therefore seek a new information-dissemination re-strategy to prevent Nigeria from being wrongly perceived.